Behind the Global Stage: the Role of Domestic Politics in Shaping State Behaviour

Written by Alba Azzarello (BSc International Relations)

The role of domestic politics in international institutions is a contentious point. It can be argued that domestic politics are not only influential, but at times largely definitive of a state's behaviour within international institutions. Analyses of domestic politics give significant clarity to questions of international institutions’ impact, their formation, norm dissemination, and state compliance or lack thereof. This can be seen through domestic administrative incapability as a cause for state non-compliance, the importance of state identification with norms in defining compliance, and the role of appeasement of domestic political entities in the creation of international institutions.

Insurmountable administrative (in)capability

A notable consideration of domestic politics is quintessential to the understanding of state compliance, as well as state involvement in varying institutions. Firstly, the culture and administrative capability of a state is highly limiting to a state’s ability to comply with goals and agreements set by international organisations. States that are administratively challenged, either in terms of high costs or a lack of streamlined organisation, have been found to be less compliant with agreed upon goals by international organisations. This has been seen in terms of non-compliance with the European Court of Human Rights (Panke, 2019). Countries that had lower administrative capabilities were found to have more human rights rulings against them by the ECHR. Because of low administrative capability, nations struggle to implement policies that comply with international standards, even when states have submitted to these. Administrative incapability hinders state's ability to comply despite a motivation and desire to.

This is perfectly exemplified by Italy’s slow adoption of gender equality policies, adhering to EU policy. Its problematic bureaucratic system lacks the mechanisms necessary to implement proper gender equality legislative reform (Rosselli, 2014). An already lethargic bureaucracy is further challenged by a highly machistic, patriarchal society (Rosselli, 2014), which causes notable pushback creating additional obstacles. Due to this, international institutions may undertake a ‘management approach’ to facilitate these processes. This can be through funding, advisories, and aid to nations such that administrative limitations aren’t insurmountable. Domestic administrative ability can be pivotal in defining whether a state will comply with policy, and is highly influential in a state’s involuntary non compliance with international institutions.

State behaviour as a function of culture

Domestic culture is further influential in state behaviour within international institutions as a catalyst or block of international norms. Norms that are highly valued domestically become priorities for states to project domestically, fulfilling a norm disseminator role. This was embodied in Norway's internalisation of marine stewardship and conservation as a constitutive norm of the nation, due to close cultural ties with fishing and its coastlines. The internalisation of these norms led Norway to spearhead certain institutional shifts for ocean conservation. It was an active participant in the drafting and implementation of the UNCLOS, and has made the principles of United Nations Global Compact for Sustainable Oceans pillars of its marine conservation efforts (Fasoulis, 2022).

Similarly, shifts in domestic norms and values can translate to shifts in state’s behaviours within the international system. This can be seen with the case of the United States Civil Rights Movement. The value of racial equality became widespread and internalized within American culture and legislation, embodied in the passing of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act in 1964 and 1965, respectively. After the struggle for Civil Rights and the entrenchment of this norm within American society, American foreign policy and behaviour within international institutions followed suit; as evidenced by the United States’ passing and support of Resolution 418 of the UNSC, condemning South African Apartheid and implementing sanctions against the government. Just 13 years before, the norm had not even been internalised within the United States, however its institutionalisation domestically led to a shift in the United States' behaviour on the global stage within international bodies.

This can be further explored in considering the extent to which the perception and identification with an international norm will influence a state’s compliance with international institutions encompassing it. The importance of domestic norms and identity is evident when considering the variance in state compliance. A state that normatively identifies with the values of an international institution can generally be seen to more easily and willingly comply with these. This is evidenced in Germany’s case while joining the European Monetary Union. As Risse outlines, membership within the EMU became a fundamental aspect of German identity, with “being a good European” becoming synonymous with “being a good German” (Risse et al., 1999). Hence, Germany was more willing and able to implement the austerity measures that were necessary to join the EMU (Risse et al., 1999). Because they normatively identified with the values of an integrated Europe through the EMU, it was easier for the state to comply. Contrarily, states that do not normatively identify with international institutions have shown to be less compliant. This is exemplified by China’s lack of compliance with human rights standards, despite being party to many international institutions which enshrine these rights as basely fundamental. As these are not normatively embedded with China’s identity as a state, the practical implementation of these standards of human rights, such as freedom of speech, is not compatible with the state identity. Therefore, China joins many of these institutions in order to be a respected player on the political stage, as well as projecting its own interpretations of these norms, arguably even weaponizing these (Zhang, Buzan, 2019). However, because it does not identify with these values, it does not comply with them.

In these ways, we see that domestic norms and domestic interpretations of international norms are inextricably linked with state behaviour within international institutions. To discuss state behaviour in the international system without examining these fails to consider that state identity does not exist in a vacuum, and it is important in defining agency, and state intentions, notably within international institutions.

One game, two fields

Furthermore, domestic politics are instrumental in the adoption and ratification of treaties and international law. As Robert Putnam denotes it, states are playing “two-level games” (Putnam, 1988). Negotiations on the international stage are complex enough as is, with states attempting to find compromises between at times mutually exclusive interests. However, these complexities are further by the entanglement of domestic politics, as these must not only satisfy the representative of the state, but the entire domestic political machine. A state’s behaviour within an institution is defined by this complex “game” that a state must play. A state’s win set will define how far a state can go to achieve an all encompassing resolution or agreement within an international institution, and these win sets are entirely dependent on the domestic politics, pressures, and priorities. It will impact the likelihood of cooperation as well as the relative gains of cooperation (Putnam, 1988).

Depending on a state’s level of democratisation, these “two level games” may become more precarious, as more agents must be appeased within the domestic political sphere. A state which is largely authoritarian is less influenced by the domestic limitations of these two level games, as the actors it must appease and consider are significantly limited. Therefore, negotiations revolve largely around a singular body.

However in highly democratic states, negotiations become far more convoluted as states cannot afford to “give a little” for fear of lack of ratification or political domestic blocks to implementation, and the negotiations being rendered therefore fruitless. This was demonstrated with the lack of ratification of the League of Nations Charter by the US Senate, expelling the US from the organization entirely (Mazower, 2013). Despite President Woodrow Wilson’s spearheading the effort, Republicans within Congress felt it would commit the USA to too many expenses, leaving the USA unable to defend its own interests (Mazower, 2013). The United States’ non participation in the League of Nations Covenant is most adequately explained by a failure of the “two level games”. Wilson failed to negotiate a Covenant that would adequately appease domestic actors, leaving his efforts fruitless. Through this example, it is evident that what and to what extent a state will negotiate within an international institution is highly dependent on its domestic limitations, most notably when it is a highly democratic state.

Therefore, a failure to encompass these in any analysis of negotiation and design of international institutions paints an incomplete picture of why and how they come to be.

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, it is essential to consider the role of domestic politics in the creation, design, operation, and impact of international institutions. Failing to consider this results in a surface level understanding at best; depicting only the tip of the iceberg. As has been argued in this essay, domestic constraints in the form of administrative inefficiency and state incapability can be directly causal to a state’s involuntary noncompliance with international institutions. In order to understand the tangible impact of international institutions, these considerations must be examined. Secondly, domestic politics and identity play a quintessential role in the formation of international norms which become institutionalised by international organisations, and conversely, can be a significant hindrance to their dissemination. To discount the role of domestic culture and identity leads to a lack of understanding of how the foundational norms of international institutions come to be, as well as how they are eroded. Lastly, domestic politics and their organisation is highly influential in what states will be willing to compromise, and is entirely definitive of states’ win-sets. Neglecting to consider this causes a failure to account for certain aspects of state behaviour within international institutions.