European Immigration Policy Challenges: How the simplification of reality hinders the quest for a solution

Written by Julia Kastner (BSc Politics and Economics)

Immigration and Populism

With the rise of populism and anti-immigrant sentiment over most of Europe, politicians are forced to admit that something about their immigration and integration policies does not work. As democrats try to stop populists from taking over the discussion on immigration, one significant aspect is being overlooked.

Common analyses of the rise of populism treat it and its anti-immigrant sentiment as a single phenomenon. However, I would argue that it is a category of socially contingent phenomena. The degree of dehumanisation differs between European countries depending among others on the potential for perceiving communitarianism in the immigrant population. Through the examination of the cases of Italy, Spain, France, Germany and the UK, I shall propose an analysis that explains how current immigration and integration policies fail to protect societies from populism and the potential repetition of history.

Protesters gather to protest against President Trump’s order banning refugees and citizens of 7 majority Muslim countries from travelling to the US.

The stances of populist parties on immigration

There are two arguments against immigration that are usually discussed in the political programmes of populist parties. One is that immigration poses a threat to the national culture by allowing other cultures to enter the country. In extreme cases, this argument is based on the inferiority of other cultures. The second general argument is that immigration poses a threat to the economic welfare of the nation as the state needs to spend more money on immigrants. I would argue that differentiating between these arguments is essential as they have very different implications. The former argument has a much stronger dehumanising effect than the latter as it implies that immigrants inevitably pose a threat to the nation. Meanwhile, according to the “threat to economic welfare” argument an immigrant who claims few social benefits does not pose a threat. Furthermore, historically the “threat to culture” argument based on cultural inferiority has shown to be much more dangerous as the belief that another “people” is truly and deeply different and inferior to yours is a necessary condition for committing crimes against humanity.

In Italy, the Fratelli d’Italia (Fratelli d’Italia, 2018) and Lega Nord (Lega Nord, n.d.) parties primarily emphasise the high costs immigration imposes on the Italian state and thus primarily use the “threat to economic welfare” argument.

In Spain, the populist party Vox (Vox, 2021) links multiculturalism to the depreciation of neighbourhoods and proposes widespread refusal of immigrants to integrate. Vox focuses on the “threat to culture” argument while also implying the “threat to economic welfare” argument.

In France, the Rassemblement National also claims that assimilation has become impossible due to communitarianism and separatism (Rassemblement National, 2024). They further wish to allow for the expulsion of any foreigner from France. Here, the emphasis on the “threat to culture” argument and dehumanisation of immigrants is stronger.

In Germany, the AfD argues that immigrants contribute to crime, terrorism, separatism and unemployment in Germany (AfD, 2021) and advocates for a selection of immigrants based on their cultural and religious background. The AfD has an even stronger focus on the “threat to culture” argument and propagates an inferiority of other cultures.

In the UK, Reform UK proclaims that British culture, identity and values must be protected while also calling on the protection of wages of British nationals and public services (Reform UK, 2024). Even though there is implicit mention of the “threat to economic welfare” argument, the emphasis remains on the “threat to culture” argument. It is also implied that other cultures are inferior.

As argued, it is essential to understand what the causes for these different forms of anti-immigrant sentiment might be.

The relevant factors

As anti-immigration sentiment is usually rather targeted at asylum applicants than immigrants coming from relatively wealthy European countries, this analysis will focus on data on asylum applicants when available. The factors I have chosen will serve the assessment of integration into social structures, perceived integration, actual cost and perceived cost of immigrants. How strongly the native-born population may perceive immigrants as a homogenous separate group will be determined through the proportion of non-national citizens to the entire population in 2022, the national, linguistic and religious diversity between asylum applicants from 2014 to 2023 (2019 in the case of the UK) based on the largest groups making out the first 50% of all applicants and the cultural difference in levels of context when communicating between asylum applicants and the national population. Integration into social structures shall be assessed by the risk of social exclusion, participation in education and training and employment rate relative to nationals. Then the general social state of society will be evaluated through the poverty risk in 2018 and the state’s total social expenditure per inhabitant in 2021 (2018 in the case of the UK). This will be compared to the actual mean net fiscal position of immigrants from 2007 to 2018 compared to the native-born population, which is harder to observe in everyday life. For each of the five countries, the factors will be evaluated in comparison to the rest of the group.

Italy 

I will start by presenting the data relating to integration and cost in Italy.

With 6.2% non-EU-28 citizens Italy has a low ratio of immigrant population compared to the other four states (Eurostat, 2023). Within the asylum applicants, there is a medium level of national diversity. 14% are Nigerian, 12% Pakistani and 11% Bangladeshi (Eurostat, 2024a).  There is a high level of linguistic diversity (Bilingual Jobs, n.d.) and a medium to high ratio of Muslims (PBS LearningMedia, n.d.). The cultural differences between Italians and the nations of provenience of asylum applicants are moderate. Italy is a mid to high-context culture while those of asylum applicants are of higher context (Meyer, 2016). Therefore, Italian nationals have moderate cause to perceive immigrants as a homogenous and distinct group of people.

However, immigrants have double the risk of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2024e) and half the rate of participation in education and training (Eurostat, 2024d). Yet, they have equal employment rates (Eurostat, 2024c). This shows that immigrants are only moderately well-integrated.

The general social state of Italy is problematic. Compared to the other countries, there is a high risk of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2024e). The welfare state is medium to weak as the expenditures per inhabitant only amount to 70% of those of Germany as the highest spending state (Eurostat, 2024f). In this context, non-EU-28 citizens have a positive effect on Italy’s fiscal income. Extra-EU immigrants have a net fiscal position of 767€ compared to -1672€ of native-born citizens (Boffi et al., 2024). The “threat to economic welfare” argument is not valid.

What becomes clear through this first example is that the actual state of society does not matter. The low levels of integration are secondary because nationals will not strongly perceive immigrants as an own separate group in society. However, even though immigrants have a positive contribution to the fiscal state, nationals are only aware of the tragic social state of Italy, and it is easy for populists to present immigrants as the culprits.

Spain

Spain has a medium ratio of non-Spanish inhabitants with 8.6% non-EU citizens (Eurostat, 2023). There is a low level of national diversity among asylum applicants as 34% are Venezuelan and 25% Colombian (Eurostat, 2024a). Hence there are extremely high levels of Spanish speakers (Bilingual Jobs, n.d.) and Christians (PBS LearningMedia, n.d.) within asylum applicants. As one would expect, the cultural differences in communication are minimal (Meyer, 2016). Nevertheless, there is high potential for Spanish nationals to perceive immigrants as a separate community of its own due to the high homogeneity of national provenience.

Non-EU-28 citizens have a 2.35 times higher risk of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2024e), participate 23% less in education and training (Eurostat, 2024d) and are 13% less likely to be employed (Eurostat, 2024c). Overall, there is moderate integration of immigrants.

The general social state in Spain might be the most problematic out of our five states. It has the highest risk of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2024e) and the weakest welfare state (Eurostat, 2024f). However, as was the case in Italy, the net fiscal position of non-EU-born citizens in Spain is much more positive than that of native-born citizens with -161€ compared to -1756€ (Boffi et al., 2024).

Even though the social situation is as problematic in Spain as in Italy, the “threat to culture” argument seems to carry more weight. I would theorise that this is because immigrants can be easily portrayed as a distinct community that poses a threat to Spanish culture. As these groups are also more at risk of poverty, the claim that immigrants bring depreciation might seem plausible. In this case, we see that even though there would have been a much higher potential for the “threat to economic welfare” than the “threat to culture” argument, if culture can be perceived to be at risk, economic welfare becomes secondary.

France

France has a low ratio of foreign inhabitants as only 5.6% of the population comes from non-EU countries (Eurostat, 2023). There is high national diversity among the asylum applicants as no nationality is dominant (Eurostat, 2024a). There is also high linguistic diversity (Bilingual Jobs, n.d.) and a medium ratio of Muslim population (PBS LearningMedia, n.d.). The level of cultural differences is also moderate as France has a mid-high context communication culture and the countries of asylum applicants have a higher context culture (Meyer, 2016). Thus, there is little cause for French nationals to perceive immigrants as separatist based on cultural differences.

However, non-EU-28 citizens are at a much higher risk of social exclusion as it is more than three times as high as that of nationals (Eurostat, 2024e), they have a 40% rate of participation in training and education (Eurostat, 2024d) and a 30% lower employment rate (Eurostat, 2024c). Integration is very weak.

The general social situation in France is good. It has the lowest risk of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2024e). It also has a strong welfare state as France’s total social expenditure is almost as high as that of Germany (Eurostat, 2024f). Yet, the net fiscal position of non-EU citizens is slightly more negative than that of native-born citizens (Boffi et al., 2024).

Therefore, in France the “threat to economic welfare” argument would be valid.

France exemplifies that cultural differences might not be the only factor that contributes to a divided society. If immigrants are decisively badly integrated this could also be observed and lead to the perception of immigrants as a separate community. Moreover, even if immigrants do pose a cost to the fiscal state, the absence of reminders of the struggles of the welfare state leads to the irrelevance of the “threat to economic welfare” argument.

Germany

In Germany, a medium ratio of 7.6% of the population are not citizens of EU countries (Eurostat, 2023). Within the asylum applicants of the past ten years, there is little national and linguistic diversity. 31% are Syrian, 12% Afghan and 9% Iraqi (Eurostat, 2024a) while 77% of those originate from a country where Arabic and Kurdish are spoken (Bilingual Jobs, n.d.). Moreover, there is a high ratio of Muslims (PBS LearningMedia, n.d.). The cultural differences between communication types are also big. In Germany, low context communication is more common whereas in countries of provenience of asylum applicants, higher context is the norm (Meyer, 2016). Hence, in Germany, immigrants could more easily be perceived as a separate community that decisively differs from the nationals.

However, non-EU-28 citizens only have a 40% higher risk of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2024e), they have a 40% higher participation rate in education and training (Eurostat, 2024d) but a 30% lower employment rate (Eurostat, 2024c). Therefore, compared to the other four countries, immigrants are well integrated into the structures of society.

The general social situation in Germany is medium to good. There is a mid to low risk of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2024e) and the welfare state leads in total social expenditure (Eurostat, 2024f). The net fiscal position of non-EU-born inhabitants of -6376€ is 2.6 times as negative as that of native-born of -2433€ (Boffi et al., 2024). Thus, the “threat to economic welfare” argument would have a strong basis.

More than in the previous cases, in Germany the potential for perceiving communitarianism overshadows the state of integration that the figures would imply. A very strong apparent difference between immigrants and nationals allows populists to portray immigrants as a separate community and to dehumanise them. Moreover, it has once more been shown that despite the “threat to economic welfare” argument being valid, it is not emphasised so long as the general social situation is not problematic.

United Kingdom

The UK has high levels of immigrant population with 10% being non-EU-28 nationals (Cuibus, 2024). There is a moderate level of national diversity among asylum applicants where regional diversity however is low (Eurostat, 2024a). Furthermore, there is a medium level of linguistic diversity with 19% stemming from countries where Arabic and Kurdish are spoken (Bilingual Jobs, n.d.). There is a medium to high proportion of Muslim believers (PBS LearningMedia, n.d.). Additionally, the cultural difference between British communication and that of the countries of provenience of asylum applicants is big (Meyer, 2016). Therefore, there is a high potential for nationals to perceive immigrants as a separate group in society, though not as high as in Germany.

In the UK, immigrants only have a slightly higher risk (40%) of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2024e). Their participation rate in education and training is 20% higher (Eurostat, 2024d) and their employment rate only 15% lower (Eurostat, 2024c). These figures would suggest that immigrants are relatively well integrated in the UK.

The general social situation in the UK is moderate. There is a medium risk of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2024e) and there is a moderately strong welfare state that spends 78% of its German counterpart (Eurostat, 2024f). Yet, the net fiscal position of non-EU immigrants in the UK per capita is two times as negative as that of British nationals (Vargas-Silva et al., 2024). The “threat to economic welfare” argument would be valid.

The case of the UK seems to be similar to that of Germany, if less extreme. The actual state of integration is good but due to a moderate to high potential for nationals to perceive immigrants as a distinct community, the focus on the “threat to national culture” argument is strong. Likewise, despite the immigrant population posing a net cost to the fiscal state, the lack of extreme social issues means that the “threat to economic welfare argument” has less traction.

Attempted Analysis

The table above summarises the foregoing data.

As can be seen, the “threat to economic welfare” argument is only highlighted by populists if the general social situation is problematic. The actual costs of immigrants to the fiscal state are irrelevant. One can also differentiate between countries with different potentials for a perception of communitarianism. Spain has a somewhat high potential and thus the “threat to culture” argument is also utilised. Despite the potential for the “threat to economic welfare” argument being much higher, Vox puts more emphasis on the “threat to culture” argument. It thus appears that the “threat to culture” argument has higher electoral salience as people may be more receptive to the subjective and abstract concept of culture.

The case of France shows that when integration is low, the “threat to culture” argument is emphasised by populists. In this case, however, the argument does not strongly focus on the inferiority of other cultures.

This is different in Germany and the UK. It seems that the higher the potential for a perception of communitarianism, the stronger the focus on the inferiority of other cultures. Here, again the actual levels of integration do not matter when there is a high potential to perceive immigrants as separatist.

An important analysis is therefore that factual circumstances do not matter to people as long as an argument is compatible with their perception of society. True integration can hence only be achieved if people perceive immigrants to be part of their community.

Policy implications

 While the case of France shows that the success of current integration policies is significant, the more dangerous forms of populism that suggest an inferiority of other cultures are fuelled by the potential for perceiving communitarianism. To protect societies from the rise of such dangerous ideologies, it seems that an additional form of policies is needed. Those are policies that aim at diminishing the perceived “difference” of immigrant populations. One approach would be to distribute immigrants over European states in such a way as to allow for the maximum national and linguistic diversity possible. Another potential course of action would be to increase the cultural and social exchange and thus the exposure to the national culture.

Discussion

 Yet, the question remains whether the end of avoiding the rise of dehumanising and appalling populist ideologies justifies the implementation of policies that ultimately aim at assimilation. Those policies could in themselves pose a danger due to their discriminatory nature. They might thus encourage ideas of superior and inferior cultures.

Another aspect that must be considered concerns the validity of this analysis. This article assesses national data to highlight how complex the problem of immigration in Europe is due to its diverse manifestations. However, what should also be taken into account is how the situation may vary on the regional level. No country has a geographically homogenous distribution of immigrant population, integrational structures or social risk. It would thus be necessary to carry out a similar regional analysis before being able to draw conclusive policy implications.