Friend or Foe? China's Ambitions in the SCO

Written by Mariam Sardzhveladze (BSc International Relations)

In 2001, China established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a regional organised initiative meant to unite Central Asian countries under the umbrella of a collective security framework. As a steppingstone aimed to boost China’s geopolitical presence in the region, it has utilised the organisation to address issues in its primary areas of security and economic concerns. Consequently, historical distrust regarding the role China aims to play in the ever-changing international order and power dynamics have led to wider debates regarding how China utilises its growing influence in the SCO to create China-centric priorities reflective of its domestic agenda and national policies.

At its establishment, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) included China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, but its gradual growth in geopolitical acclaim has increased its membership to include India, Pakistan, and Iran by 2023, with the joining of Belarus in 2024. The primary aims of the intergovernmental organisation are to strengthen and promote economic and political cooperation between its member states while guaranteeing collective peace and security through its institutionalised structures. Today, the SCO has been able to successfully address issues on counterterrorism and border disputes, coordinating joint military exercises, but it continues to struggle on creating opportunities for economic integration in areas of free trade (FTA) or energy due to disputes.

China’s interests within the SCO are highly debated within the international circle. While some analysts believe China’s main goals lie within its security concerns, others argue it utilises the SCO to protecting its economic cooperation in Central Asia. Arguably, both views are intertwined, as China seeks to create favorable regional conditions to complement its increasing economic involvement in the SCO member states while guaranteeing its domestic stability, which could be disrupted by the geographical proximity of its Western neighbours’ internal instabilities. For these reasons, China’s efforts within the SCO have focused on maintaining regional stability and cooperation as key to safeguarding its economic and political ambitions both abroad and domestically, often at the expense of the organization’s multilateralism.

Economic Cooperation (or Coercion?)

Expanding the framework beyond security measures has allowed China to pursue economic cooperation in alignment with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Launched in 2013, China’s BRI aims to expand international trade and infrastructure development to the participant regions through economic integration, creating a modern version of a Silk Road with 151 countries. Led by China-driven investment projects, most of the SCO’s states have become participants in China’s BRI, allowing it to garner member states’ support in legitimising its economic initiatives within the organisation. This factor is reflective within China’s plans to establish China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCAWEC) as a chain of transport routes to enhance regional trade throughout mentioned regions, with SCO serving as a platform for its negotiations.

On the other hand, China’s interest in energy, stemming from the need to fuel its economic growth and increasing population demands, has translated to fostering closer economic ties with SCO’s biggest energy suppliers: primarily Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia. Most prominently, the China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CCAG) – a BRI energy infrastructure project spanning from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region – acts as a part of SCO’s wider efforts to build oil and gas pipelines throughout Central Asia. Ultimately, it utilises the multilateralism in the SCO to further its wider BRI and energy aspirations by creating new opportunities for economic cooperation.

Nevertheless, while fostering economic development within the SCO’s member states, the resulting dependencies on Chinese investments have been used as leverages for Beijing to safeguard its domestic interests. Primarily reflected within the cross-river management dispute with Kazakhstan, China avoids decreasing its upstream water consumptions from major cross-border rivers that flow from the Xinjiang region into several Central Asian countries. Despite the members’ insistence to negotiate the collective issue within the SCO’s framework, Beijing continues to refuse, protecting its unlimited upstream use of water for hydropower and irrigation to support development in its Western provinces. Hence, SCO’s states avoid adopting a more assertive approach out of concern for potential withdrawals of Chinese investments as retaliation, which are essential to fuelling their domestic growths, allowing China to indirectly shape SCO’s security priorities.

Counterterrorism and Xinjiang

One of the major aims of the SCO is its efforts to combat the “three evils” – terrorism, extremism and separatism. Many argue that due to Beijing’s growing concerns over domestic separatism, China pushed SCO from its early focus on issues regarding border demarcations to tackling cross-border security threats in areas such as Islamic extremism.

In recent years, by framing its internationally criticised suppression of Uyghur separatism and anti-Uyghur policies in Xinjiang as part of SCO’s battle against the “three evils,” China has been able to continue dismissing accusations of human rights abuses from the Western world while framing it as part of its counterterrorism measures. In turn, China has been able to gain SCO’s multilateral support in legitimizing its domestic activities in Xinjiang by aligning it as part of the organization’s broader security strategy. With member states avoiding public criticisms of China’s domestic affairs, Beijing has been able to subvert international scrutiny.

Additionally, Xinjiang is China’s only common border with Central Asia; a region with which Xinjiang shares strong historical and ethnic links. Its richness in natural resources is of high interests to China, with 80% of the country’s precious metal reserves being located in Xinjiang, along with the crucial oil and natural gas reserves in Dzungeria and Tarim Basins. For this reason, strong security links established through the SCO realise prevention of any potential support that Central Asian states may offer to the separatist movements in Xinjiang, allowing China to continue securing this vital region for its economic gain.

Simultaneously, China has also utilised the SCO’s fight against separatism and counterterrorism as a way to not only reinforce its domestic security, but also to protect its investments abroad. The establishment of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in 2004 allowed the organisation to prioritise fighting terrorism through joint military exercises, facilitating exchange of information as well as prevention of drug trafficking. More specifically, in pushing member states to strengthen their internal regimes and prevent the rise of separatist movements through SCO’s structures, China seeks to build their regional stability to defend its economic investments and protect its own citizens abroad from potential escalations. In the similar fashion, analysts argue China also views it as a way of protecting its boarders from any potential influxes of extremism into Xinjiang from countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In these ways, it continues to exert its economic and security incentives through the mechanisms of the SCO.

Geopolitical Influence and Russia’s Counterbalance

The SCO has allowed China to promote an alternative vision for regional security, aimed at counterbalancing Western-led dominance in the international system. By engaging with Russia and other Central Asian member states within the SCO bloc, not only does it aim to serve as a counter to the major Western alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but it promotes China’s ‘Beijing Model’ of development and an “alternative vision for the world order”: which can be defined as mutually beneficial economic cooperation, pursuit of common destiny and non-intervention in internal affairs. By reducing the influence of Western norms and the United States in the region, China is able to continue growing and exerting its influence through the SCO as a way to secure its geopolitical interests in the member states’ regions.

However, the Sino-Russian rivalry present within the SCO’s regional dynamics can create difficulties for China to exert regional leadership. With most Central Asian member states being once a part of Soviet Union under Moscow’s leadership, the historical ties with Russia reinforce its existing dominance in the area. Previously, supported by the SCO members, China has been involved in opposing Russia’s stance in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008. Similarly, in 2010, Beijing has partnered with Uzbekistan in preventing Russia’s influence on Kyrgyzstan’s domestic crises. In recent years, while sharing a closer partnership, the nations’ views regarding the SCO have often been cited to diverge. For instance, Russia’s support for India’s membership with the SCO was met with the Chinese lack of enthusiasm, later balanced through the inclusion of Pakistan in the organisation. For this reason, China faces struggles in navigating Russia’s persisting influence in the member states, impacting the balance of power within the SCO and constricting Beijing from freely pursuing agendas which do not align with Russia’s rhetoric.

Challenges and Implications

China faces obstacles in battling the historically engraved skepticisms of its regime, which result in signs of increasing retaliation by member states against excessive dependency on China’s economic investments. Accused of applying “pressure tactics” to solve water management disputes with the Central Asian counterparts, increasing concerns over China’s coercive strategies in diplomacy have raised questioned regarding its future ambitions in the SCO. As a result, accusation of China’s pursuit of hegemonic expansionism ambitions becoming more prevalent in the conversation in the Central Asian regions has created difficulties for China in battling rising sentiments of Sinophobia.

What’s more, diversity in national interests and economic conditions of the SCO member states within the organisation have created issues on collective alignment. A prominent example are the historical tensions between India and Pakistan have played a role in impeding smoothness of SCO’s processes, often refusing to be involved in bilateral negotiations. Thus, contrasting national interests of member states and varying levels of economic development could make it difficult for China to assert itself in seeking multilateral support in the SCO without it facing accusations of hegemonic ambitions.

Nevertheless, despite these challenges, it is evident that China has had a major influence in defining key priorities of the organisation over time. Specifically, China has utilised the SCO framework to enforce its goals by introducing economic cooperation and counterterrorism as the main areas of the organisation’s concern, fortifying its geopolitical influence by counterbalancing potential Western involvement in the region. Therefore, it can be argued that the increasing China-centric nature of the SCO may become a tool for China to establish a regional order that aligns with its domestic and international aspirations. The implications may undermine the multilateral framework that would equally prioritise the national interests of all member states.