From Pariah to Partner: MBS, Trump, and the Remaking of U.S.–Saudi Relations

Yasmina Kassir, BSc International Social and Public Policy

When I think back to the Saudi Arabia I left nearly a decade ago, the contrast with today’s kingdom is striking. The muted skyline, stricter social boundaries, and the oil-centric economy belong to a different era. The rise of Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, and the launch of Vision 2030 have accelerated a transformation that has not only reshaped the country internally but redefined its global role. The 2025 Washington summit showcased that shift ① with unprecedented clarity.

The Crown Prince’s November trip to Washington was a multi‑day, high‑profile summit that marked his full rehabilitation in the US capital. Trump welcomed MBS with open arms and effectively opened the doors of the White House to him, staging a red‑carpet reception beyond standard diplomatic protocol, signaling his full return to Washington’s inner circle. The timing of the summit is no coincidence: it sits at the intersection of Trump’s strategic ambition to recast Middle Eastern alliances and MBS’s drive for Saudi Arabia’s economic and social transformation. These priorities are simultaneously interdependent and in tension. Furthermore, central to Trump’s broader attempt to reshape regional diplomacy has been his pursuit of a far-reaching normalisation framework between Arab states and Israel ②. Securing Saudi Arabia’s entry into the Abraham Accords represents, for him, the ultimate prize, which is the formal unveiling of a new regional blueprint.

Yet MBS has repeatedly affirmed that Saudi Arabia will not concede to Israeli normalisation without the recognition of Palestinian statehood ③ . This ongoing tension was presumably expected to dominate the summit’s agenda ②. However, to much surprise, advancement on Palestinian statehood in exchange for normalisation was scarcely addressed ③ . Instead, Riyadh was presented with a new Strategic Defence Agreement ① , coupled with plans to acquire F-35 jets. By advancing Saudi defence capabilities without demanding immediate steps towards Israeli normalisation, Washington signalled a recalibration of its regional priorities.

The summit demonstrates that Washington is no longer calibrating its Middle East security policy around Israel’s needs. Rather, it is elevating Saudi Arabia upward as a parallel strategic ally; in part driven by concerns that Riyadh may drift towards Beijing if Washington fails to meet its expectations. Prior to this summit, reports noted Trump’s complaints that the Saudi’s are ④, “ With China now” due to insufficient U.S. support, promising to “win them back” ④ and “always protect them”. These remarks underscore that the real contest is as much about global competition as regional stability.

Even with this enhanced strategic standing, the defence commitments made to Saudi Arabia fall short of a NATO-style guarantee. Unlike the binding US–Qatar executive defence pact ⑤ signed in the aftermath of Israel’s recent escalation, the Saudi agreement offers security cooperation without the legal obligation to intervene. This makes the summit not the last word or a final guarantee, but a substantial step toward pulling Saudi Arabia more tightly into Washington’s orbit ⑤, while signalling that the most consequential promises may still depend on future negotiations; including the unresolved trajectory of the Israel–Saudi normalisation track.

But the most telling moment of the visit came not in the defence pact or the F-35 flyover, but in how Trump handled the question of Jamal Khashoggi. The 2018 killing of the Washington Post journalist, a prominent critic of Saudi Arabia’s human rights record, cast global attention on those very abuses. Departing from Trump's embrace, the Biden administration previously ‘distanced’ ⑥ itself rhetorically from MBS, and briefly declassified parts of the CIA assessment of the murder. Though not a full isolation, Washington's behavior towards the Crown Prince was certainly more receptive ⑥, and reflected a greater willingness to attack some political cost to the killing itself.

On the other hand, when questioned on Khashoggi during the November press appearance, Trump dismissed ⑦ the journalist as controversial and stated that “things happen,” ⑦ insisting that MBS had known nothing about the murder, directly contradicting US intelligence findings. In an even greater display of deference Trump scolded the question itself, claiming that revisiting a “forgotten” case embarrassed their guest ⑧ claiming that MBS has done incredibly things for human rights. The 2025 summit therefore marks not a sudden break, but a culmination: after years in the cold, MBS now receives overt, public rehabilitation in Washington, with Trump advancing a level of praise that exceeds previous administrations. This interaction epitomises Washington’s new normalisation of impunity, dismissing alleged human-rights abuses while criticising anyone who dares to question them.

Saudi Arabia is no longer the regional actor observing from the sidelines, Trump has brought the kingdom onto centre stage alongside Washington: across security, investment, and the broader Middle East order. The real test now lies in what follows, and whether this partnership can withstand the pressures that have undone so many before it.

Sources:

① Andrew Leber, « MBS Wanted Status. Trump Wanted Deals», Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 November 2025.

② Leslie Vinjamuri, « In His Pursuit of Peace, Trump Defers the Difficult Details »,The Chicago Council on Global Affairs , November 21, 2025.

③ Mat Nashed and Justin Salhani, « What’s on the agenda as Saudi Arabia’s MBS meets Trump in the US?», Al Jazeera, 18 November 2025.

④ Christopher Preble and Will Smith, « Trump doesn't need to buy Saudi loyalty with a security pact » , Responsible Statecraft ,11 November 2025.

⑤ F. Gregory Gause ,« Trump-MBS summit: Good feelings, real commitments, and unresolved questions », Middle East Institute, 21 November 2025.

⑥ Stephanie Kirchgaessner,« US finds Saudi crown prince approved Khashoggi murder but does not sanction him » , The Guardian, 26 February 2021.

⑦ Kevin Liptak, « Trump claims slain journalist Khashoggi was ‘extremely controversial,’ defends Saudi crown prince », 18 November 2025.

⑧ Graeme Wood ,« Trump’s Self-Damning Response to a Legitimate Question », The Atlantic, 19 November 2025.