Syria's President, al-Julani’s journey from terrorist to a legitimatised President

Journey from caves, shelters, and chicken coops to the Presidential palace.

Written by Sarah Hussain (MSc Political Science)

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, is no stranger to reinvention. Once a senior leader within al-Qaeda and the founding emir of Syria’s Salafi-jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra, he now occupies the presidential palace in Damascus. Officially inaugurated as President of Syria on January 29, 2025, al-Julani has been the country’s de facto ruler since December 2024, a remarkable ascent for a man once on international most-wanted lists. Since then he has carefully shaped a polished image: wearing Western suits, giving interviews to foreign media, and portraying himself as a stabilising force in Syria’s fractured landscape.

Al-Julani's path to power began not in politics, but on the battlefields of insurgency. Born in Riyadh to a Syrian family and raised in Damascus, he joined al-Qaeda in Iraq prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion. In 2012, he went on to establish Jabhat al-Nusra, with direct backing from al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was on the FBI’s most wanted list. This lasting affiliation highlights his steadfast ideological commitment to the group, as such an endorsement would only be given to someone deeply embedded within its inner circle. In 2016, al-Julani publicly severed ties with al-Qaeda, widely seen as the first step in a calculated ambitious rebranding. He then transformed al-Nusra into a “reformed” group - Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) claiming a more localised, Syrian-focused agenda. However, a name change did not reform the actual ideology, but this was enough for them to start peddling their new propaganda.

Beyond 'Indiscretions': The Brutal Past

Al-Julani in interviews, dismisses his past as a time of possible "mistakes", insisting that "the past is the past". The appeals to the international community frame al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, as an irrelevant historical footnote, a sentiment his supporters vigorously promote online. However, this call to disregard the past is analytically flawed. The organization's well-documented operational history demonstrates that it was a definitive Salafi-jihadist entity, wholly adopting al-Qaeda's core ideology and its characteristic brutal methods, making any narrative of reform fundamentally unconvincing. While such a defence might be extended to an ordinary individual, applying it to a former terrorist commander sets a dangerous precedent one that risks legitimising other armed actors who seek political relevance not through accountability, but through rebranding.

The group’s campaign, under both its Al-Nusra and HTS designations, was marked by:

• Mass-Casualty Urban Bombings: The group specialised in sophisticated, high-impact suicide vehicle attacks, demonstrating a blatant disregard for civilian life. A prominent example is the March 2017 Damascus bombings, for which HTS claimed responsibility, killing at least 114 people.

• ·Sectarian Civilian Targeting: Their doctrine included deliberate sectarian violence, such as the massacres of Alawite villagers and bombings targeting Shiite pilgrimages, aiming to incite and exploit communal divisions.

• Political Assassinations and Intimidation: They employed a systematic campaign of terror to suppress dissent, including the elimination of journalists, execution of detainees, and assassination of high-level officials.

• Ideological Propaganda and Symbolic Desecration: The group utilised its media arm, al-Manara al-Bayda, to glorify violence and promote jihad. This was complemented by acts of symbolic desecration, such as the destruction of religious sites, including the historic Cathedral of St. George, to erase cultural heritage and assert ideological dominance where fighters drilled out the eyes of icons depicting St. George and the dragon.

• Forced Taxes: HTS forced farmers in Idlib to pay levies and “taxes” on wheat harvests under the pretext of collecting “zakat” (almsgiving required as one of the five pillars of Islam). 

• Systematic Abductions and Detentions: HTS routinely targeted members of religious minority groups as well as Sunnis with killings, kidnappings, physical mistreatment, and arbitrary detentions. These actions resulted in the deaths and disappearance of thousands of civilians. A 2023 UN Commission of Inquiry report noted HTS's continued arbitrary detention of activists, journalists, and civilians critical of its rule or religious doctrine.

The record of even HTS and not only al-Nusra, detailed also by U.S. State Department archives ① shows only a snapshot of atrocities that mirror, without distinction, the tactics employed by the Islamic State and other extremist groups. If this is a resume, it is not that of a statesman, but of a warlord. The international community’s current emphasis on engaging with al-Julani as a statesman has largely overshadowed any meaningful discussion of his group’s extensive crimes, which are well documented and remain a matter of public record.

The ideological continuity within HTS was starkly evident following its 2024 takeover, when its fighters were photographed and filmed wearing the traditional black insignia associated with the Islamic State. These flags are now openly sold in local markets, clearly indicating that the ideology has become widespread and has found acceptance among segments of the general population. This symbolism underscores a fundamental reality despite its different name, HTS shares the same core Salafi-jihadist doctrine as the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh). This rebranding is merely superficial, as it leaves the core Salafi-jihadist ideology untouched. Without a fundamental change in doctrine, genuine reform is impossible.

This continuity is seen by the personnel within al-Julani's circle. His media and political advisor is Ahmad Muaffaq Zidan, a journalist with longstanding ties to jihadist figures. Zidan conducted several interviews with Osama bin Laden and was identified by exposed CIA information as a bin Laden ally with connections to Al-Qaeda. The appointment of such a figure highlight that the regime's ideological commitments have not been abandoned.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s dismissal of al-Julani’s extremist past as simply “a strong background” highlights a dangerous new reality the line between terrorist and legitimate leader is becoming perilously blurred. The indiscretions of his early years carry far greater weight than the narrative suggests. This was not a passing phase of youthful rebellion, it was his tenure as emir of the al-Nusra Front a designated terrorist organisation and as the leader HTS, which itself held terrorist designations the European Union, the United States and even Turkey. Understanding his past compels a critical re-evaluation of the opposition to him. Such opposition cannot be dismissed as mere sympathy for the Assad regime rather, it must be recognised as a potentially principled stance against terrorism, regardless of newly adopted political labels. This distinction is made clearer by the actions of HTS, which consistently reflect the behaviour of its predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra, and by extension, al-Qaeda.

Reports of continued abductions and sectarian violence suggest the movement's ideological core remains intact. This creates a fundamental vulnerability for al-Julani: his authority rests on controlling a faction whose goal the establishment of an Islamic state has not been renounced, only deferred. If the foreign fighters and hardline elements within his ranks grow disillusioned with his political project, al-Julani would face an impossible choice, re-embrace their revolutionary jihad or be overthrown by them.

The most striking element of al-Julani’s reinvention is his dramatically altered support base. Once revered solely by al-Qaeda loyalists, he now garners legitimacy from former adversaries, including former CIA Director David Petraeus and President Donald Trump, who notably described him as an "attractive guy" with "potential." This turnaround by the West and its institutions, which had previously labelled him a terrorist, marks a staggering reversal in logic. In this new calculus, Western support is extended to a former jihadist, while critics are aggressively dismissed as "Assadists." The implications are profound it suggests that a legacy of extremist violence is no longer a barrier to legitimacy but can be reframed as a kind of "strength" within the cynical calculus of geopolitical strategy.

Sources

① « 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria », U.S. Department of State, 2023.