Japan at a Demographic Crossroads: How the Takaichi Administration Could Reshape Immigration Policy

Harunori Umehara
Dec 2
7 min read

Harunori Umehara MSc in International Social and Public Policy (with Fudan)

A demographic ticking time bomb ①, Japan’s struggle with demographic decline has become more than a domestic policy challenge. This issue is increasingly central to the country’s geopolitical relevance, economic vitality, and long-term strategic stability. As the nation grapples with persistent low fertility rates, an ageing population, and intensifying labour shortages across multiple sectors, immigration has emerged as one of the few viable levers for maintaining national competitiveness. Yet migration policy remains ideologically sensitive in Japan, tied closely to debates over cultural identity, social cohesion, and the boundaries of national belonging.

In October, Former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba passed the baton to Japan’s first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi. Within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Ishiba and Takaichi represent two distinct interpretations of what immigration should achieve and how foreign workers should be integrated into Japanese society. While Takaichi’s appointment is symbolically significant for Japan’s political history ②, the more consequential shift lies in her ideological stance. Their contrasting visions offer two divergent pathways for Japan at a time when the country cannot afford strategic drift. As Japan confronts demographic decline, immigration policy has become a vital tool capable of sustaining social and economic stability. In this regard, Takaichi’s leadership not only signifies a change in political stance but a pivotal moment that may redefine how Japan responds to its demographic crisis.

A Tale of Two Leaders: Competing Ideologies of Ishiba and Takaichi

Since immigration has become crucial to addressing Japan’s demographic crisis, political leadership plays a significant role in redirecting the country’s policy. It is in this context that the contrasting visions of Ishiba and Takaichi become critical.

Ishiba has long been considered a moderate conservative, drawing support from local governments, labour experts, and segments of the bureaucracy that recognise the urgency of addressing population decline. With his experience as a renowned defence expert in the Japanese political scene, his ideology is grounded in pragmatism. For Ishiba, immigration is a core national issue ③ tied to economic sustainability, administrative coherence, and the need to support rural revitalisation efforts. His approach is incremental but open-minded, establishing clearer pathways to permanent residency, stabilising the Specified Skilled Worker system, strengthening training mechanisms, and improving integration support for workers already embedded in Japanese communities. While not an advocate of mass migration ④, he acknowledges that Japan’s demographic trajectory requires openness that moves beyond temporary worker schemes. For many voters, however, Ishiba’s idealism is seen as not ‘conservative’ enough ⑤ to tackle the growing concerns amongst the Japanese citizens.

Takaichi represents the other end of the LDP’s ideological spectrum. Rooted in right-leaning conservatism, her political platform is shaped by an emphasis on cultural continuity, national security, and a cautious approach to foreign presence. Aiming to become Japan’s ‘Iron Lady’ ②, Takaichi views immigration through the lens of control rather than integration. As a nationalist, she favours strictly delineated temporary worker programs, heightened border security and vetting procedures, reduced opportunities for family reunification, and limited pathways to permanent residency or long-term settlement ⑥. Contrasting Ishiba’s stance, this approach resonates strongly with voters concerned about rapid societal change, even as it conflicts with the demographic needs articulated by economic institutions and local governments.

High-skilled migration is an area where both personalities partially agree on. Both leaders value high-skilled talent, but their priorities differ. Ishiba values foreign researchers, engineers, and entrepreneurs as the essence of long-term competitiveness and prosperity. On the other hand, Takaichi views high-skilled migrants as acceptable only with restrictions, particularly in the area of national security. Due to the rise of disputes with China, for example, growing concerns over securitisation, especially over artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and intellectual property, may leave room for these restrictions.

Demographic Pressure as Policy Driver

Japan’s demographic situation has reached a tipping point where policy choices are now constrained by the reality of a structural crisis. With a fertility decreasing each year for 9 years at around 1.2 (2023) ⑦ and a rapidly declining working-age population ⑧, the country’s labour force is expected to continue declining ⑨ dramatically over the next several decades.

Local governments are increasingly raising their voices in requesting foreign workers to maintain their economies. The depopulation of small towns is increasing at an alarming rate. Young people move to large cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, while the elderly remain and take care of their local communities. This phenomenon has left municipalities dependent on foreign workers to carry out basic roles ⑩ in different sectors, such as aquaculture industries, construction, and nursing, through the introduction of the Specified Skilled Worker System (SSWS) ⑪ in 2019.

How Immigration Policy could Shift Under Takaichi

A transition from Ishiba to Takaichi could undeniably produce noticeable shifts across several dimensions of immigration. These changes would not come exclusively through lawmakers as Japan’s immigration system is often shaped through cabinet directives, administrative application, and reinterpretations of guidelines ⑫. Thus, even slight political actions can alter immigration policy.

Labour migration would experience the most immediate impact. Under the new Takaichi administration, it is likely that the SSWS will still remain in function. However, unlike Ishiba’s emphasis that on enhancing the functions of the SSWS to attract skilled foreign labour into the country ⑬, Takaichi’s administration implies that it may possibly impose harsher restrictions on the time period in which foreign nationals can reside in Japan, types of industries, and legal status. Narrowing of the functions of the SSWS would essentially limit the possibility for long-term settlement in Japan, and provide immigration as a stabilising mechanism solely temporarily. Furthermore, Takaichi’s emphasis on cultural preservation suggests a resistance to permanent residency. Already considered to be very difficult to obtain, Japanese permanent residency may face additional administrative procedures of evaluation. Spreading across marriage and civil partnerships, as well as family reunification, this would negatively affect the retention of foreign skilled migration workers.

A Takaichi ‘reshaping’ of immigration policy would also reshape regional diplomatic relations. Relations with China have become more fragile ever since Takaichi took office, with stricter screening for Chinese students and workers ⑭. Often described as a ‘hawk’ on China, her provocative claims on Taiwan have led the Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism ⑮ to warn Chinese citizens against traveling to Japan. In the near future, Japan’s tourism industry will take a hit as Chinese tourists less consider Japan as a destination. Meanwhile, ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia and Vietnam, which supply the bulk of Japan’s migrant workforce ⑯, may become increasingly concerned about the stability of labour migration. Yet, it is important to note that these dynamics could influence Japan’s diplomatic posture, as countries treat labour agreements as key components of bilateral relations.

Asylum and refugee policy would also likely be faced with tough restrictions. Considering that Japan historically admits very few refugees and Takaichi’s firm alignment with conservatism and law-and-order preferences, it suggests that detention, deportation, and limited humanitarian exceptions would continue. To an extent, Takaichi’s stance towards asylum and refugee policy aligns with Japanese history and public opinion. Contrasting the recent trends, Ishiba showed a more welcoming attitude to improve procedural transparency and programs that are in accordance with OECD standards, seen through the Japanese Initiative for the Future of Syrian Refugees (JISR) ⑰, and his support for Ukraine ⑱.

A nationalist turn in migration policy would shake across the world, affecting Japan’s partnerships, strategic frameworks, and soft power. As the international community closely monitors Japan’s mobility situation, potential foreign labour may consider migrating to Singapore or South Korea, where the stance on immigration policy is comparatively more welcoming.

Conclusion

The transition from an Ishiba administration to a Takaichi administration would redefine Japan’s position on immigration at a critical time of global political uncertainty. Japan’s future prosperity critically depends on its ability to adapt to the ever-growing competitive world. The demographic landscape of Japan is the centre of the issue that needs to be addressed. The central question of this issue is not whether Japan will accept foreign workers or how many will be accepted, but under what conditions, terms, expectations, and relationality to the national identity.

Ishiba and Takaichi represent polar opposites: one grounded in pragmatism and adaptation, the other rooted in cultural conservatism and security alertness. Fundamentally, Japan’s immigration debate is tied to the country’s future. Leadership not only shapes the policies that oversee foreign labour and the external relations, but also reverberates to the Japanese society, especially in an era that faces demographic change at a concerning rate.

Sources

① Shiro Armstrong, « Japan’s ageing population is ticking towards disaster » ANU

Reporter, 31 January 2023.

② Tinshui Yeung, « Meet Japan's drum-playing, Thatcher-loving first female prime

minister » BBC, 21 October 2025.

③ « Policy Speech by Prime Minister ISHIBA Shigeru to the 214th Session of the Diet »

Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, 4 October 2024.

④ Maximilien Xavier Rehm,« Ishiba walks a political tightrope on immigration » East

Asian Forum, 19 July 2025 .

⑤ Yvette Tan, « Japan is set to choose its fourth PM in five years - who could be next? » BBC, 8 September 2025.

⑥ Kazuto Suzuki, « Sanae Takaichi sees herself as the successor to Shinzo Abe. But

changes in Japan’s politics present big challenges » Chatham House, 22 October 2025.