Rethinking India’s China Strategy: Strategic Alliance or Autonomy

Esha Toshniwal, BSc International Relations and History

On the night of June 15, 2020, the Galwan Valley in Ladakh witnessed Indian and Chinese troops engaged in the most brutal border skirmish between the two countries in over 45 years. The confrontation resulted in the deaths of roughly twenty Indian and four Chinese soldiers ①, marking a turning point in Sino-Indian relations. Since Galwan, China has built permanent military infrastructure along the Sino-Indian Line of Control, signalling hostile territorial ambitions. China poses not only military and territorial but also diplomatic and economic challenges to India. Growing Sino-Pakistani cooperation, such as Chinese investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, coupled with the extension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with investments into countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, and Maldives ②, has strategically encircled India within South Asia. Notably, India remains fairly economically interdependent with China: its trade deficit with Beijing reached about US $99.2 billion in FY 2024-25 ③. Further hostilities leave the country vulnerable to China weaponing this trade deficit against it.

Given this increasingly complex and intricate dynamic, this article will critically evaluate whether India should counter China through closer alignment with the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies or uphold its long-standing tradition of strategic autonomy by building a more inclusive regional order.

India’s Foreign Policy Tradition

India’s foreign policy tradition is one of ‘strategic autonomy’ ④, the successor to the Nehruvian doctrine of non-alignment during the Cold War, under which India refused to join either the U.S. or Soviet bloc. This policy reflects a determination to avoid relationships of subordination and to ensure that India can act independently in global affairs. In practice, this doctrine resembles “bandwagoning” ⑤, where India leverages partnerships with multiple great powers on a case-by-case basis to advance its national interests without committing to binding alliances. Interestingly, this strategy carries a certain irony: public sentiment envisions India as a rising great power, but can a nation truly claim such status without accepting the costs and commitments that traditionally accompany it?

India’s Options: Alliance or Autonomy

Option A: Formal Alliance with the U.S.

A formal alliance with the United States could strengthen India’s capacity to counter China’s growing territorial assertiveness in South Asia. Historically, Washington has gone to considerable lengths to support India’s rise in Asia, viewing it as a bulwark against China. For instance, the 2008 U.S. – India civil nuclear agreement ⑥ granted India access to global nuclear commerce despite not signing the NPT. This logic underpins the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), an informal security partnership between India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia.

The pertinent question, then, is why has India chosen to resist the Quad’s transformation into a formalised security alliance ⑦? This reluctance stems from three interlinked considerations: conflicting values and objectives with the United States, the sensitivity of India’s security relationship with China, and India’s commitment to strategic autonomy.

Initially, the Biden administration’s criticism of India’s democratic backsliding and human rights record cast doubt on New Delhi’s ability to lead any democratic coalition in the Indo-Pacific. The Trump administration, while less vocal on these issues, ushered in a period of trade tensions, imposing tariffs of up to 50% on Indian goods ⑧. Such friction has obstructed efforts to hone a beyond-transactional relationship between the two nations.

Further, the Quad’s overt collective security approach aimed at Chinese containment has alienated New Delhi. It has been deliberately cautious about exacerbating Sino-Indian tensions, which it wishes to de-escalate, given the Indian and Chinese economies are interdependent.

Finally, a formal alliance with Washington would risk undermining Indian strategic autonomy. Aligning with U.S. security priorities could compel India to distance itself from long-standing partners such as Russia, on which it remains heavily dependent for defence equipment procurement and energy cooperation.

Option B: Building its own Strategic Backyard

Rather than pursuing formal alignment with the United States, and consistent with India’s policy of strategic autonomy, lies a vision grounded in pluralism and inclusivity. Within this framework, India can engage with the Quad not as a formalised security community, but as a flexible partnership for advancing shared Indo-Pacific goals. This allows India to collaborate on practical areas such as capacity building, infrastructure development, and the provision of international public goods, without being drawn into risky containment strategies or alliance commitments.

This outlook has been a consistent feature of Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In 2018, he declared that “India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members,” ⑨ reaffirming the country’s preference for transparent, collective development. His ‘Act East’ policy, exemplified by the recent Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR) initiative ⑩, promotes maritime security, freedom of navigation, and shared prosperity across the Global South. This region-first strategy enables India to sustain diverse economic and strategic partnerships - with the United States, Russia, the European Union, and ASEAN countries - while avoiding binding obligations to any one power.

Evaluation and Policy Recommendation

In theory, Option A offers India an additional layer of security through a military alignment with the United States. However, the cost of strengthened deterrence and defense cooperation are high: India being drawn into a relationship of subordination by tying it too closely to U.S. security priorities.

While Option A resorts to hard power to contain China in the Indo-Pacific region, Option B enables India to manage China’s rise through soft power - leveraging influence, diplomacy, and regional partnerships rather than confrontation. This approach is more pragmatic, given India’s ongoing border crises and economic interdependence with China. From a macro perspective, it also contributes more effectively to global stability by preserving a multipolar world order, rather than reinforcing a unipolar or bipolar system with the U.S. and China holding the reins. Option B effectively positions India as a bridging power between the developing and developed worlds, consolidating its role as an independent actor in a multipolar Indo-Pacific.

Sources

① Soutik Biswas, « Jammu and Kashmir: India formally divides flashpoint », BBC News, 16 June 2020.

② Darshana M. Baruah, « India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia », Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 August 2018.

③ Manoj Kumar, « India trade deficit with China widens to record $99.2 bln amid dumping concerns », Reuters, 16 April 2025.

④ Davide Donald, « India Between Superpowers: Strategic Autonomy in the Shadow of a Pacific Conflict », CFR Blog, 16 December 2014.

⑤ Yogesh Joshi, « India’s Radical Reimagination: No More Bandwagoning, for Real. », The Washington Quaterly, 16 December 2022.

⑥ U.S. Department of State, «U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative», State Department Archive, 15 October 2008.

⑦ Kate Sullivan de Estrada, « India and order transition in the Indo-Pacific: resisting the Quad as a ‘security community.’ », The Pacific Review, 9 January 2023.

⑧ Abhishek Dey, « India's exports to US plunge as Trump's 50% tariffs bite », BBC News, 16 October 2025.

⑨ Rahol Roy-Chaudhury « Modi spells out free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific policy », IISS, 7 August 2018.

⑩ DD News, « From Sagar to Mahasagar: Experts call PM Modi’s maritime shift strategic and visionary », DD News, 23 May 2025.