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Redrawing the Nile: Power, Water, and Politics in the Age of the GERD

Dina Ebrahim


In September 2025, Ethiopia officially inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a project that has been both a source of national pride and a cause of intense geopolitical tension. With an installed capacity of over 5,000 MW, the dam promises to provide much-needed energy to Ethiopia and position it as a regional energy hub. The GERD's significance extends far beyond its electricity output. The dam has fundamentally altered the balance of power in the Nile Basin, challenging Egypt’s longstanding dominance over the river’s resources and raising fears in Sudan and Egypt about water security. The GERD is not merely an infrastructure project; it is a powerful symbol of Ethiopia's ambitions for economic development, regional influence, and control over its natural resources.


While the GERD is undoubtedly a remarkable engineering achievement, its implications for the geopolitics of the region are more profound. The debate surrounding the dam is not solely about hydropower or water flow, but about sovereignty, historical grievances, and the future of water governance in a region already grappling with the challenges of climate change and political instability.


A Colonial Legacy and the Nile Order


Disagreements over the use of the Nile have existed long before the GERD was announced, driven by the river’s critical importance to the countries that depend on it. Historically, Egypt enjoyed more power over the Nile. Colonial era agreements divided the Nile's waters with little regard for the upstream nations that control its headwaters. The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, a product of British colonial rule, allocated the majority of the river's flow to Egypt, with Sudan receiving a smaller share. The agreement granted Egypt the right to veto any construction projects that would affect the country’s interests while allowing Egypt to undertake projects without permission. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, which further solidified Egypt's position, allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters of water to Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters to Sudan, leaving the remainder of the estimated average annual yield of 84 billion cubic meters to account for seepage and evaporation. The agreements took no account of the upper riparian countries, including Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia, which argued that they are not bound by these agreements since they were never parties to them. The agreements ignored Ethiopia’s claim to the Nile, even though it controls the Blue Nile and contributes about 85% of the Nile’s flow. This exclusion laid the groundwork for the profound sense of injustice that Ethiopia continues to feel.


These historical agreements have left a legacy of unequal water distribution, with Egypt and Sudan holding the lion’s share of the Nile’s resources. The dam, therefore, is not only about energy and development for Ethiopia, but it is also about challenging the political order that has governed the river since the colonial era.


Impacts of the GERD on Downstream Nations


The GERD has raised significant concerns for Egypt and Sudan, but are these worries justified?


Egypt depends on the Nile for about 90% of its freshwater. The country is already considered to be in a water deficit, as the current supply of water does not meet the needs of its population. Its agricultural sector, food security, and overall national stability are all closely tied to the steady flow of Nile water. Any disruption, such as a reduction in water availability or unpredictable release of water from the dam, is perceived as a direct challenge to the country’s survival.


The filling of the dam’s reservoir, which began in 2020, has raised concerns about whether sufficient water will be released downstream, particularly during drought periods. The uncertainty surrounding the speed of filling and the volume of water retained in the reservoir, which holds a capacity of 74 million cubic meters, exacerbates these fears. Ethiopia’s insistence on controlling the filling process and withholding guarantees about water release during dry years has left Egypt feeling vulnerable. Egypt’s demand for specific, legally-binding agreements on water distribution reflects the perceived risks to its water security. The dam could reduce the flow of water into Egypt, and the country could face serious water shortages if the dam filling coincides with periods of drought.


Sudan, while positioned differently, also faces substantial risks. The dam presents potential benefits, such as more regulated water flows, increased hydropower, and more irrigation land. The dam could potentially allow Sudan to receive a more even distribution of flow throughout the year, rather than depending on specific seasons. This could also regulate constant flow for the Merowe Dam and reduce sediments in the Nile, which can allow it to generate electricity more evenly throughout the year. Sudan could stand to benefit agriculturally more than Egypt and Ethiopia if the filling and releasing of the dam were coordinated and conducted in collaboration. Studies have not found any significant impact on the Roseires and Merowe reservoirs during the filling of the GERD’s reservoir since 2020; however, they have noted that this may be mitigated by heavy rainfall and may differ during years with less rainfall.


The dam is located in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, only 9 miles east of the border with Sudan. This puts Sudan at a higher risk of flooding, especially if releases are uncoordinated. Just like Egypt, Sudan is vulnerable to water supply risks during drier seasons if Ethiopia chooses to prioritise its own electricity needs over releasing sufficient water downstream.


The uncertainty surrounding the GERD’s operation makes Sudan a vulnerable player in the dispute. The political instability in Sudan, exacerbated by ongoing conflict, has further hindered its ability to assert its interests in negotiations.


Recently, after the inauguration of the GERD and the release of water from the dam, both Egypt and Sudan experienced severe floods. Both countries attributed the flooding to uncoordinated or sudden releases of water from the GERD, which overwhelmed local infrastructure, particularly in Egypt’s Nile Delta and Sudan’s agricultural heartland. Although Ethiopia contends that the dam's regulated release of water helped mitigate flood risks, the lack of coordination has raised alarms over future flood management and the potential for similar disasters. The flooding further underscores the need for greater cooperation and transparency in the management of the dam to prevent adverse impacts on downstream nations.


The Politics of the GERD: Beyond Hydraulics


While the technical aspects of the GERD—its hydropower potential, water regulation capabilities, and the management of the reservoir—are critical, the underlying issues are political in nature. The dispute is not simply about how water flows through the dam, but about who controls it and who benefits from it. For Ethiopia, the dam is a symbol of national development and self-reliance. It represents a break from dependency and a step toward modernity. Ethiopia sees the dam as an assertion of its sovereignty over its own resources and refuses to be bound by agreements that were made without its consent.


Egypt, on the other hand, sees the dam as a threat to its sovereignty. The Nile has long been Egypt's lifeblood, and the country’s position as the dominant power in the Nile Basin has been a cornerstone of its national identity. Egypt's demand for a legally binding agreement on water volumes is driven by the need for security, that its supply of water will not be disrupted and that the country will retain control over the resources it has relied on for millennia. This demand for specific guarantees reflects Egypt's deeply held belief that any alteration to the flow of the Nile could have disastrous consequences for its agriculture and economy.


The negotiations surrounding the GERD have revealed the extent to which the politics of the Nile are shaped by historical power dynamics. Despite multiple rounds of talks under the auspices of the African Union and other international bodies, the three countries have been unable to reach a binding agreement. The political standoff is characterised by a lack of trust between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan, with each country prioritising its own national interests over regional cooperation. Ethiopia's refusal to provide clear commitments on water releases and Egypt’s insistence on guarantees are just two sides of the same coin: both nations are struggling to maintain control over a shared resource.


Adding another layer of complexity is the reality of climate change. As weather patterns become increasingly unpredictable, the risk of prolonged droughts and shifting rainfall patterns heightens. The Nile, already subject to seasonal variations in flow, will become even more vulnerable to the effects of climate change. This uncertainty increases the stakes of water sharing negotiations and makes the political dynamics even more fraught. With the climate crisis threatening to exacerbate water scarcity in an already stressed region, the GERD is not only an infrastructure project but also a test of how the Nile Basin’s nations can manage shared resources in an era of increasing environmental uncertainty.


Ethiopia’s right to control its own natural resources and pursue development through the GERD should not be undermined. However, this right must come with a commitment to fair and transparent water sharing agreements that safeguard the interests of its neighbors, particularly Egypt and Sudan. While Ethiopia has every right to pursue energy independence and regional development, the unilateral decisions made throughout the GERD project have deepened mistrust and hindered progress. To prevent the continuation of a zero-sum gain, where one country’s gain becomes another’s loss, Ethiopia should be open to regional cooperation on the operation and hydrological decision-making of the dam.  On the other hand, Egypt must accept the changed political dynamics of the Nile; the colonial agreements that once placed Egypt at the helm of Nile water governance no longer hold the same weight. To support this new geopolitical reality, Egypt must adapt its approach to talks. Despite Egypt and Sudan’s historical relationship and Egypt’s strong influence on Sudan, Sudan must remain open to coordination with Ethiopia to ensure shared water security, regardless of Ethiopia and Egypt’s relationship. 


The best path forward lies in establishing a regional treaty that maximises collective benefits, rather than prioritising narrow national interests. This treaty should focus on equitable water distribution, ensuring that all nations in the Nile Basin, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan, have a fair stake in the river’s resources. It should include clear protocols for water release, flood control, and drought mitigation to protect Sudan and Egypt. 


A New Era for the Nile Basin


The GERD represents more than just a shift in how the Nile’s waters are managed; it marks a turning point in the region’s geopolitics. For Ethiopia, the dam is a symbol of its rise as a regional power. For Egypt, it is a challenge to its historical dominance over the Nile. Sudan, positioned between the two, faces an uncertain future as it tries to navigate the competing interests of its neighbours. In a region already burdened by political instability and economic challenges, the GERD has become a focal point for broader questions about development, sovereignty, and regional cooperation.

The GERD is only part of what the Prime Minister hopes for Ethiopia: more development now with better access to electricity and the ability to sell electricity to its neighbours, such as Kenya, Djibouti, and Tanzania, as part of improving its foreign relations. If it hopes to strengthen its foreign relations, it must foster cooperation with its downstream neighbours, Sudan and Egypt.


As the GERD continues to operate, its success will depend not just on its ability to generate electricity but on the ability of Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan to negotiate a framework for cooperation. The dam’s future will be determined by more than just its engineering design; it will be shaped by the political will of the countries that share the Nile and their ability to transcend the historical legacies that have divided them.


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