top of page

The Overlooked Geopolitics of the Chagos Islands: Beyond the UK-US Narrative

Updated: Feb 28

Written by Noémie Anglade, MSc Development Management on the 16th of February 2026


When the United Kingdom and Mauritius signed a historic treaty on May 22, 2025 – transferring sovereignty of the Chagos archipelago back to Mauritius after decades of dispute – much of the Western coverage fixated on a familiar perspective: why did Britain agree to the deal? Why did Trump call it a "great stupidity" in January 2026, only to change his opinion weeks later? The focus remained mostly on Western geopolitical anxieties. Regarding Mauritius's perspective, the objective appeared straightforward: regaining sovereignty that had been stripped away in 1965 as the price of independence. 


This framing, while understandable, overlooks dimensions of the Chagos story that allow for a more complete analysis. The Chagos Archipelago sits at the intersection of intensifying great power competition in the Indian Ocean. Beyond the UK-US perspective lies a more complex geopolitical landscape: India's positioning to consolidate its influence on the Indian Ocean, China's economic footprint, and Mauritius itself navigating between major powers to maximise strategic advantage.


Most troubling of all, this geopolitical theatre overlooks the people for whom this deal matters most: the Chagossians. An estimated 10,000 Chagossians and their descendants, scattered across the UK, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, learned about their homeland's future from the media, rather than at the negotiating table. Their exclusion from the 2025 negotiations echoes the pattern of the 1960s: between 1967 and 1973, the UK forcibly removed between 1,500 and 2,000 islanders to make way for the US military base, a removal the International Court of Justice has later ruled unlawful.


This article explains why this remote archipelago dominates headlines in 2026, and why the treaty generates such intense international debate. Western perspectives provide only a part of the story. A fuller picture requires examining multiple actors: the UK, India, China, and Mauritius. Each has distinct stakes in this archipelago, making the Chagos Islands far more than just a subject of bilateral sovereignty dispute.



The United-Kingdom's Tactic Calculation


The UK's decision to pay £3.4 billion over 99 years to lease back Diego Garcia (the largest island in the Chagos archipelago) requires understanding both the island's strategic value and Britain's credibility concerns.


In 1965, three years before Mauritius gained independence, the UK separated the Chagos archipelago from Mauritius and created the British Indian Ocean Territory. The following year, Britain leased Diego Garcia to the United States to construct a military base. The 1966 Exchange of Notes between the two governments established that the "Territory shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty", while making it available for US defence. 


What makes Diego Garcia priceless is its geography. Located at the Indian Ocean's centre, roughly equidistant from Africa's east coast and Indonesia, the island became "a cornerstone of American power projection in the Indo-Pacific, reinforcing US influence across the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia". The base was used during the Cold War, now supporting U.S. led operations  like strikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen.


By 2019, Britain's legal position was compromised. The International Court of Justice ruled that the UK administration was unlawful and that "the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible". The UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding the UK's withdrawal within six months. The UK was not bound to do so, but its credibility was at stake: How could Britain condemn Russia's violation of international law in Ukraine while defying the UN's highest court? How could the UK criticise Trump's threatened seizure of Greenland while refusing to comply with its own international legal obligations? As James Brocklesby noted, "Britain's attempt to 'do the right thing' over Chagos [...] reflects a rules-based worldview that is under pressure" in a “world less governed by law and more by power”.


So while the UK government stated it would "address wrongs of the past", the Chagos deal was driven by legal vulnerability and strategic necessity rather than justice alone. This explains both the timing of the deal - now, after decades of resistance - and the archipelago’s prominence in international media: their geographic position makes them central to US and UK defence across the Indian Ocean, turning a remote archipelago into a highly contested geopolitical issue.



India's Unnoticed Strategic Positioning


What much coverage misses is India's role in the Chagos deal. In May 2025, India's Ministry of External Affairs welcomed the treaty as completing Mauritius's decolonisation "in the spirit of international law and a rules-based order". This was more than a diplomatic courtesy. As the Lowy Institute notes, "India's backing of Mauritius on Chagos is not just a legal or moral position; it is a calculated geopolitical move within a shifting Indo-Pacific order".


With the Chagos treaty, Mauritius’s maritime zone expands to 2.3 million square kilometres, roughly the size of Algeria, covering strategic shipping lanes and potential mineral resources. This expanded EEZ created an opportunity for India, by positioning itself as a partner for Mauritius in the monitoring of the larger maritime zone. In September 2025, New Delhi announced a $680 million economic package for Mauritius.  The package included the joint redevelopment of Port Louis harbour, cooperation on monitoring the Chagos Marine Protected Area, and the provision of helicopters. For Mauritius, this partnership benefits both its defence capabilities and economic development. For New Delhi, it gained access to a broader regional surveillance network.


India’s approach reveals another geopolitical dimension of the Chagos Islands: while the UK and the US prioritise military access, India’s interest focuses on maritime partnerships and surveillance cooperation to expand regional influence. These layered dimensions - military, maritime protection, economic - explain the growing intensity of media coverage surrounding the Chagos Islands. 



The Contradictory Narrative on China


The ‘China threat’ plays an important part in the debate over the Chagos deal, with Western arguments contradicting each other. UK government officials defended the treaty as preventing rival powers from gaining access. As ITV News noted, without a deal, the UK faced the risk of “hostile states like China establishing military bases on neighbouring islands”. Defence Secretary John Healey stated in May 2025 that allies, including the US and India, supported the agreement, while China, Russia, and Iran wanted to see the deal collapse.


Yet, the UK politicians opposed to the deal argued the reverse. Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch stated the Chagos deal "weakens UK security” and makes the UK and “NATO allies weaker in face of (their) enemies". Shadow Foreign Secretary Priti Patel also accused Starmer of handing "control of Chagos to a country that is actually cosying up with Russia and China". So which is it?  Does the deal restrict or enable China? Evidence gives a more balanced picture.


The economic partnership between China and Mauritius is substantial. In 2021, a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries took off and reached approximately $1.1 billion in 2024. As the Sunday Guardian stated, “the period from 2022 to 2024 recorded the highest foreign direct investment inflows in Mauritius’ history, with China identified as a priority partner”. In addition, Chinese firms also secured “contracts with 20 to 50 year concessions”, showing the importance of China’s footprint in Mauritius' economy; hence the Western worry of losing influence in the region against China. 


Now, the Chagos treaty contains explicit restrictions for any sovereign power seeking military presence near the Chagos archipelago: the prohibition of foreign military forces from the Chagos Islands, UK veto power “on all developments” in the archipelago, and a 24-nautical-mile buffer zone around Diego Garcia. The deal will not restrain China’s economic partnership with Mauritius, but will prevent military presence near the Chagos Islands.


So overall, what Mauritius is doing is strategic hedging: economic partnerships with China, security cooperation with India, and defence arrangements with the UK and the US. By positioning itself at the intersection of great powers, Mauritius makes the Chagos deal a case study in navigating geopolitical competition, further fueling international debate.


The Unheard Voices of Chagossians


While the great powers negotiated control of the Indian Ocean, 10,000 Chagossians were excluded from decisions about their own future. Between 1967 and 1973, Britain forcibly expelled 1,500-2,000 people. A 1966 telegram between diplomats stated: "There will be no indigenous population except seagulls". UK authorities cut food shipments and prevented medical access.


The May 2025 treaty repeats this pattern of exclusion. Chagossian Voices stated: "The views of Chagossians [...] have been consistently and deliberately ignored and we demand full inclusion in the drafting of the treaty". Olivier Bancoult, leader of the Chagos Refugees Group, also demanded “that Chagossians be actively involved in every step of the negotiation process”.


This participation is even more needed, as the barriers to resettlement are severe. The treaty allows the return to outer islands but excludes Diego Garcia, the only island with viable infrastructure. Outer islands have been uninhabited since 1973 with no housing, schools, healthcare or electricity.


A £40 million trust fund will be provided for the Chagossians, but building viable infrastructure seems more costly, and Mauritius has announced no resettlement budget or timeline. The question is whether Chagossians will be able to return to their homeland if they want to, and if so, whether the means will be provided for reconstruction on the outer islands. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination called for the suspension of ratification, stating the agreement appears in contradiction with the Chagossian right of return.


Chagossians are the first to be concerned, but as Human Rights Watch observed: "Decisions are being made about their land, about their home, about their lives without their participation". Hence, beyond the geopolitical calculations that make the Chagos deal so important, the exclusion of Chagossians also became a focal point for media coverage examining the human costs of great power competition. 


Conclusion


The Chagos deal demonstrates why remote islands remain central to 21st-century geopolitics:

  • Diego Garcia is key for US power projection across the Middle East, South Asia, and East Africa;

  • India's positioning on the treaty strengthens its sphere of influence, by both supporting decolonisation principles and diplomatic relationships with Western partners;

  • Mauritius maintains a smart balance and puts itself at the centre of geopolitical play, by partnering with both India and China, and by receiving lease payments from the UK.


Yet the deal also reveals tensions regarding how decolonisation operates when great power interests come into play. The deal is a victory for Mauritius, resolving colonial injustice, but is less clear for Chagossians. Some, while demanding active involvement in implementation, view Mauritius sovereignty as finally opening the possibility of return after 60 years of British refusal. Others are more sceptical about whether Mauritian sovereignty will actually benefit them. A 2025 poll gathering 3,600 Chagossians and their descendants showed that “over 99% of respondents (expressed) the wish to remain British”. 


Questions Moving Forward


Will the treaty survive ratification? 

The UK Parliament delayed the House of Lords debate in January 2026, following a Conservative amendment stating “the ratification process would breach a 1966 agreement between the US and UK”. While Trump announced an ‘entente’ with London in February 2026, suggesting renewed US support, the treaty still requires formal ratification by the UK.


Can resettlement actually work, and who will monitor it? 

Mauritius has announced no specific budget for building infrastructure on uninhabited outer islands. The £40 million trust fund appears insufficient for viable resettlement on islands abandoned for over 50 years. Without substantial investment beyond what the treaty specifies, resettlement could remain aspirational. 

The treaty also establishes a Joint Commission with UK and Mauritius representatives, with the US having "the right to introduce items for discussion". But Chagossians have no guaranteed seat at this table. Whether Mauritius prioritises Chagossian interests or treats the annual lease payments as general revenue will determine if resettlement ever materialises.


Can sovereignty exist without self-determination? 

This question extends beyond the Chagos Islands to broader debates about decolonisation. The International Court of Justice ruled in 2019 that Mauritius's decolonisation was "not lawfully completed" because the Chagos separation in 1965 was "not based on the free and genuine expression of the will of the people concerned". But the 2025 treaty asks the same question of self-determination: Chagossians again had no voice in this transfer. If the same pattern that created the injustice repeats in the supposed resolution, has the decolonisation process truly been finalised?



Sources


① Daniel Boffey, «What are the Chagos Islands – and why is the UK returning them to Mauritius?», The Guardian, 20 January 2026.


February 2026. 



④ «Chagos Agreement: A Geopolitical Reset in the Indian Ocean», The Mauritius Times, 23 May 2025.


⑤ Christian Edwards, «Trump think Britain would be stupid to give them up?», CNN, 20 January 2026.





⑨ Raghvendra Kumar, «How the UK Mauritius Deal on Chagos Could Reshape US Military Strategy in the Indian Ocean», Foreign Policy Research Institute, 21 April 2025


⑩ John Curtis, «British Indian Ocean Territory: 2024 UK and Mauritius agreement», UK Parliament, 31 October 2024


⑪ Anirban Bhaumik, «India supports UK-Mauritius deal on Chagos Islands in Indian Ocean», Deccan Herald, 22 May 2025.


⑫ Sanchari Ghosh, «India’s support for Chagos sovereignty speaks volumes», theinterpreter, 2 March 2025.



⑭ Archis Mohan, «India pledges $680 mn package for Mauritius to boost trade, security», Business Standard, 11 September 2025. 


⑮ «What is the Chagos Island deal?», The Week, 19 june 2025.



⑰ Alice Gibbs and John Feng, «Diego Garcia: Why Trump Is Worried About UK Handing Over Chagos Islands», Newsweek, 20 January 2026.


⑱ Abhinandan Mishra, «Economic Footprint in Mauritius Threatens Chagos Archipelago», The Sunday Guardian, 25 January 2026.


⑲ Eren Waitzman, «UK-Mauritius treaty on the Chagos Archipelago», UK Parliament, 26 June 2025.



㉑ Richard Norton-Taylor, «Dumped islanders seek to return home», The Guardian, 18 July 2000.


㉒ Richard Norton-Taylor, «The UK still shamefully occupies the Chagos islands», Progressive International, 02 June 2022.



㉓ Timothy Walker, «Blue justice will be the real test of the Chagos deal», Institute for Security Studies, 09 February 2026. 



㉕ Sholaw Lawal, «Why is the UK handing the Chagos Islands back to Mauritius?», Aljazeera, 4 October 2024. 



㉗ «UK and Mauritius’ Chagos agreement raises concerns over Chagossian people’s rights, UN committee warns», United Nations Humans Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 08 December 2025.


㉘ Mausi Segun and Ellianne Baptiste, «Paradise Lost», Human Rights Watch, 21 October 2024.  


㉙ «Whitestone Insight endorses landmark Chagos Islands sovereignty poll», Friends of the British Overseas Territories, 18 November 2025.


㉚ Thomas Mackintosh and Leila Nathoo, «Chagos Islands debate delayed as Tories call for halt to bill», BBC, 23 January 2026.





Comments


LSESU Think Tank | Best New Society 2024

bottom of page